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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue on Appeal. The issues presented to the Court for review are (1) 
whether the trial Court abused its discretion in awarding petitioner alimony in excess 
of her needs, (2) in failing to divide the retirement assets equally, and (3) in ordering 
respondent to pay petitioner's attorney's fees. 
Standard of Review. Awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). The same standard is 
applicable to the trial court's division of property. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 
820, 823 (Utah App. 1989). The standard of review of the reasonableness of an award 
of attorney's fees is "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcare v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
A. Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann.: "When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating 
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties." 
B. Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Ann.: 
(a) The Court shall consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married on September 4, 1964. They had five children, 
all of whom were emancipated prior to the parties' separation. At the time of trial, 
petitioner ("Jeanny") was employed by the Bureau of Land Management. She earned 
$2,274 per month. Respondent ("Johnny") was employed as a cabinet maker. He 
earned $4,507 per month. 
Following bifurcation, the parties stipulated to a partial division of real 
and personal property, leaving five issues unresolved for trial: 
a. Jeanny's request for an eight acre parcel of the farm 
property awarded to Johnny; 
b. the division of retirement assets; 
c. the disposition of a bank account with approximately 
$10,000 on deposit; 
d. Jeanny's request for alimony; and 
e. attorney's fees. 
Except for the retirement assets, the Court divided the real and personal 
property in a manner that favored Jeanny, and then attempted to equalize this 
discrepancy by giving Johnny $33,400 in "credits" against his alimony obligation, 
which the Court ordered Johnny to pay at the rate of $1,000 per month for ten years. 
Addressing the retirement assets separately, the Court awarded each party 
his or her retirement accounts. This left Johnny with his 401(k) account valued at 
$6,731. Jeanny received her Thrift Savings Account, which was valued at $51,385, 
her pension with an anticipated value of $150 per month.1 This division gave Jeanny 
88% of the retirement assets that existed at the time of trial, plus her pension. 
The Court then ordered Johnny to pay $2,500 of Jeanny's attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court abused its discretion in awarding Jeanny alimony in 
excess of her needs. 
The Court has broad discretion in making an alimony award, but it must 
exercise that discretion within appropriate legal standards. In Bell v. BelL 810 P.2d 
489 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that it is an abuse of discretion 
for a court not to consider each of three factors set forth in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985) in determining a spouse's need for alimony. Those factors are (1) 
the receiving spouse's reasonable and necessary needs, (2) the receiving spouse's 
ability to support him- or herself, and (3) the paying spouse's ability to make up the 
\ Both parties had also liquidated retirement assets postseparation. Johnny cashed in an annuity 
worth $5,766. Jeanny liquidated a joint IDS account worth $17,501. No consideration was given to 
any of the funds that had been spent. 
shortfall, if any. In considering these factors, the trial court is required to make 
adequate factual findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record are "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." 
Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988)). 
Here the Court made no findings regarding the Jones factors. Rather, it 
simply stated that "alimony of $1,000 per month is appropriate." This arbitrary figure 
was inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial, which established that Jeanny's 
unmet needs were no more than $178 per month. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Jeanny, her needs were 
$1,775 per month. This was set forth in her Financial Declaration, which was 
"received as a pleading" (Tr. 29). In it, she claimed to need $2,210 per month, but she 
admitted that this figure included the $335 payment on the farm property that was 
awarded to Johnny (Tr. 70). Ignoring all of the challenges Johnny made to the rest of 
Jeanny's claims, her monthly needs were therefore no more than $1,775. 
Jeanny's income was established by her wage stub (Exh. 5). It showed 
that she netted $632.08 every two weeks, or $1,369.51 per month. In addition to this 
figure, however, Jeanny was making voluntary contributions to her Thrift Savings Plan 
of $104.96 every two weeks, or $227.41 per month (Tr. 58 and 71). Adding this to 
her net income, she had $1,596.92 available to meet her monthly needs. 
Subtracting Jeanny's income of $1,596.92 from her budget of $1,775.00, 
she would be left with unmet needs of $178.08. This is the maximum amount of 
alimony that could have been awarded based on the evidence presented to the Court. 
For the purposes of this appeal, Johnny's ability to pay is conceded. 
2. The Court abused its discretion in failing to divide the retirement 
assets equally. 
Absent special circumstances, property accumulated by the parties during 
the marriage should be equally divided. Maxwell v. Maxwell 754 P.2d 84, 86-87 
(Utah App. 1990). The court ignored this principle, apparently deciding to give Jeanny 
virtually all of the retirement assets because she had earned them: "She's put that 
money in her retirement. To divide that equitably, I'm going to give it to her ... 
perhaps he ought to get some credit for that, but I'm just not going to give him any." 
Tr. 129-30. 
Johnny was an equal partner in this marriage; the distribution of marital 
assets, including retirement assets, should reflect that fact. The trial court's division of 
retirement assets, in which Jeanny received 88% of the total, was an abuse of 
discretion. 
3. The Court abused its discretion by ordering Johnny to pay $2,500 
of Jeanny's attorney's fees. 
The decision to award attorney's fees must be based on evidence of the 
reasonableness of the requested fees, the financial need of the receiving spouse, and the 
ability of the other spouse to pay. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here the court ordered Johnny to pay $2,500 of Jeanny's fees without 
addressing any of these factors. Jeanny testified that she had paid $3,000 in fees (Tr. 
44). During closing arguments, her counsel indicated that this figure was actually 
$2,500, and this was the total amount that had been billed (Tr. 113-14). 
There was no evidence of Jeanny's need. To the contrary, the evidence 
was that Jeanny had virtually all of the marital funds in her possession, and no need 
for assistance from Johnny. 
Jeanny testified that since the parties' separation, she had sold Johnny's 
boat and swather for $26,000 (Tr. 53). Half of this money was unaccounted for. The 
other half was placed "in escrow" for Johnny (Tr. 52). By the time of trial, however, 
Jeanny had changed her mind and decided to keep it all for herself (Tr. 52-53). In 
addition to this, she withdrew $11,000 and $6,501 from a joint mutual fund account in 
November 1998 (Tr. 55) by forging Johnny's name to the checks (Tr. 56, Exh. 10). 
Jeanny was allowed to keep all of this money. In the absence of 
established need, it was error for the court to order Johnny to pay any of Jeanny's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Johnny requests that this matter be remanded Willi speciik instruction^ to 
th ::: ti ial coi ir t to si itei findings ^ vhicl 1 ai e consistei it "\ < - itl 1 tl le e\ idence Jeani i> ' s 
entitlement to alimony is no more than $178 per month. Johnny is entitled to one-half 
of the retirement assets, including the pension. Finally, because there was no evidence 
of i leed on Jeanny ""s pai t, si i ; .
 : . iieiit to attoi ney 's fees. 
DATED Lliib _j_^_ lav nf Mav 2001. 
^f\ _ 
JAMESH^WOODALL 
Attorney fo^ appellant 
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IN I HE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
O l M M \II < O H M \ , U I \I1 
JEANNY 1 ,OUISE DAVIS,, 
Petiti 3nei 
vs. 
JOHlNM IMA< I\ DA \ IS, 
Respondent. 
r
 'NDINGS OF FACT AND 
NCTIJSTONS OF I A W 
Case No. 98-4800202 DA 
iudee folin R. Ajiderson 
T' • in.iivr came on for trial on July (>, 2000 before the 1lonorable John R. 
Anderson. Petitioner ("Jeanny") was prescn! and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock. 
Respoi ident (" lol n n iy") >as pi esei it ai id i epi esented by lai i les 1 1 W oodall I he Coi n t I las 
previously bifurcated this matter, having entered a decree oi divorce. 
The parties advised the < out! ih u ik Li*' n a> I M •< i i |MMII II ipuLu n n i In 
included the lol lowing lernis: 
Real Property 
1. Jeanny shall be awarded as her sole and exclusive property the residence 
located at 3067 South 500 West, Vernal. Utah, including approximately 3 acres of land. This 
property is unencumbered by debt, and is valued at SI74,000. 
2. Johnny shall be awarded as his sole and exclusive property the farm 
located at 2900 South 500 West, Vernal, Utah, which consists of approximately 46.57 acres, 
subject to Jeanny's request for an eight acre parcel of this property. This property is valued 
at $134,000. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the farm is to be sold, with all 
proceeds awarded to Johnny. 
Personal Property 
3. Johnny shall be awarded as his sole and exclusive property the 
fol lowing: 
a. The bale wagon, valued at $3,000 
b The hay baler, valued at $4,000 
c. The Case 1070 tractor, including the disc, plows, and brush hog. 
These items are owned by Johnny's parents, and no value is 
assigned to them. 
d. The horse trailer, valued at $1,000 
e. The utility trailer, valued at $1,000 
f. All power and hand tools, and all woodworking equipment in the 
shop at the residence, valued at $5,000. 
g. The parties" four horses, saddles, and tack 
h. The grand piano 
i. .50 caliber muzzleloading rifle, valued al $175 
j . Winchester .22 lever action rifle, valued at $225 
k. Winchester .32 lexer action rifle, valued at S200 
1. Marlin 12 gauge shotgun, \allied at SI 50 
m. Smith & Wesson 7mm magnum rifle, valued at S500 
n. Craiu 30-40 rifle, valued at SI25 
following: 
o. Smitli & Wesson .357 magnum pistol, valued at S300 
p. The leasehold miercsi in the 2000 CMC pickup truck 
q. The 1958 Chevrolet Impala automobile, valued at $4,500 
r. The 1985 Ponliac Ficro automobile, valued at $3,232.50 
4. Jeanny shall be awarded as her sole and. exclusive propcil llu 
a. The tiller, weed eater, and two mowers, valued at S500 
b. Household furniture, valued at $5,000 
c. The large freezer, valued at $200 
d. The small freezer, valued at S200 
e. The upright piano, valued at $1,000 
f. The 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck, valued at V. Li.*"-.^.-. 
5. , ; IK: i jurt -p;.*;* '-''- !;' . '•'- '- ' M: -Arties advised the 
C ourt that the following items remained in dispute: 
a. Jeanny's request for an eight acie JM: 
b The division of retirement assets; 
c... 
• i *- disposition of a bank account with approximately SI 0.000 
on deposit; 
d. -.-anny's request for alimony; and 
e --;ann\ 's request foi" iH^ K-\ ' fee 
The ("oiirt, having heard the teslimon\ oi the parlies, and having considered the 
evidence presented, makes the following Findings of Fact: 
6. T • • >riion of the farm is denied. 
7. The Coin"! unds thai die \alue of the real and personal property awarded 
to Jeanny is 5192,000,., and the re*n mil pi i .onal pi>»j n- IW.II ded to Johnny is $165,000. 
The difference is S27.000, which shall be characterized as a credit to Johnnv. 
8. Jeanny may retain the S6J00 that remains on deposit in the American 
Express IDS account, but Johnny shall be awarded that amount as an additional credit, plus 
S300 for the appraisal fees. 
9. The Court believes that alimony of S 1,000 per month is appropriate, 
beginning with the month of July 2000 and continuing until the first of the parties attains the 
age of sixty-five years. As of the date of trial, both parties are fifty-five years old, making 
this a ten year alimony award. Johnny shall have the option of paying this in a lump-sum, 
discounted to present value at the Federal Funds rate of 6.54%, or paying it monthly. Johnny 
shall have until July 6, 2001 to make this election. In any event, Johnny is entitled to credits 
of $33,400, which shall be characterized as prepaid alimony. 
10. Each party shall retain the retirement and pension accounts in his or her 
name. Specifically, Johnny shall be awarded his 401 (k) account at Utah Retirement Systems, 
valued at $6,730.95, the Horace Mann annuity, valued at $5,765.80, and his Utah Retirement 
Systems pension. Jeanny shall be awarded her Federal Retirement Thrift Savings account, 
valued at $51,385.40. the American Express IDS account, subject to Johnny's credit as set 
forth above, and her Federal Retirement Systems pension. Equitably, perhaps Johnny ought to 
get a portion ofJeanny's retirement assets, but the Court declines to give him any of it based 
on the Court's finding that Johnny is trained in many trades and capable of working, where 
Jeanny. after thirty-five years of marriage, is at a point in her life where she needs that 
retirement for her security. 
V! •eraaiLihi:1 Series lil; Savings Bonds shall be divided equally. 11K 
parlies ^ in identifying these b« >nds and dividing 
them equally, to include requesting an ilemi/ed list of bonds issued in the names of both 
pai ties fi oi n the I reasi try Department. 
12. Johnny is ordered to pay Jeanny $2,500 for th .iiionu*."- f<-< -*«:• i <s 
incurred m this matter. 
DATED this / p 2001. 
TOHN R. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COl !RT JUDGE 
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1 certify that 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
*** H* *T* "f* *f* t * 
[}HW *\f 
JEANNY LOUISE DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
FOLLOWING BIFURCATION 
Case No. 98-4800202 DA 
JOHNNY MACK DAVIS, 
Respondent. 
Jud^e John R. Anderson 
) 
This matter came on for trial on July 6, 2000 before the Honorable John R. 
Anderson. Petitioner ("Jeanny") was present and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock. 
Respondent ("Johnny") was present and represented by James H. Woodall. The Court has 
previously bifurcated this matter, and the Court having previously entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the following DECREE OF DIVORCE: 
1. Jcanny is awarded as her sole and exclusive property the residence 
located at 3007 South 500 West. Vernal. Utah, including approximately 3 acres of land. This 
property is unencumbered by debt, and is valued at SI74,000. 
2. Johnny is awarded as his sole and exclusive property the farm located at 
2900 Souih 500 West, VernaL Utah, which consists of approximately 46.57 acres. This 
properly is valued at $134,000. The farm is to be sold, with all proceeds awarded to Johnny. 
3. Johnny is awarded as his sole and exclusive property the following: 
a. The bale wagon, valued at $3,000 
b The hay baler, valued at $4,000 
c. The Case 1070 tractor, including the disc, plows, and brush hog. 
These items are owned by Johnny's parents, and no value is 
assigned to them. 
d. The horse trailer, valued at $1,000 
e. The utility trailer, valued at $1,000 
f. All power and hand tools, and all woodworking equipment in the 
shop at the residence, valued at $5,000. 
g. The parties' four horses, saddles, and tack 
h. The grand piano 
i. .50 caliber muzzleloading rifle, valued at SI75 
j . Winchester .22 lever action rifle, valued at $225 
k. Winchester .32 lever action rifle, valued at $200 
1. Marlin 12 gauge shotgun, valued at $150 
m. Smith & Wesson 7mm magnum rifle, valued at S500 
n. Craig 30-40 rifle, valued at $125 
o. Smith & Wesson .357 magnum pistol, valued at S300 
p. The leasehold interest in the 2000 CMC pickup truck 
q. The 1958 Chevrolet Impala automobile, valued at $4,500 
r. The 1985 Pontiac Fiero automobile, valued at $3,232.50 
4. Jeanny is awarded as her sole and exclusive property the 
following: 
a. The tiller, weed eater, and two mowers, valued at $500 
b. Household furniture, valued at 55,000 
c. The large freezer, valued at S200 
d. The small freezer, valued at S200 
c. The upright piano, valued at S 1,000 
f. The 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck, valued at SI 1.132.50. 
5. Johnny is awarded a credit of 527,000. representing the difference 
between the value of the real and personal property he has been awarded, and the value of the 
real and personal property Jcanny has been awarded. Jeanny may retain the S6,l00 that 
remains on deposit in the American Express IDS account, but Johnny shall be awarded that 
amount as a additional credit, plus $300 for the appraisal fees. 
6. Johnny is ordered to pay Jeanny $1,000 per month as alimony, 
beginning with the month of July 2000 and continuing until the first of the parties attains the 
age of sixty-five years. As of the date of trial, both parties are fifty-five years old, making 
this a ten year alimony award. Johnny shall have the option of paying this in a lump-sum, 
discounted to present value at the Federal Funds rate of 6.54%, or paying it monthly. Johnny 
shall have until July 6, 2001 to make this election. In any event, Johnny is entitled to credits 
of $33,400. which shall be characterized as prepaid alimony. 
7. Each party shall retain the retirement and pension accounts in his or her 
name. Specifically, Johnny shall be awarded his 401(k) account at Utah Retirement Systems, 
valued at $6,730.95, the Horace Mann annuity, valued at $5,765.80, and his Utah Retirement 
Systems pension. Jeanny shall be awarded her Federal Retirement Thrift Savings account, 
valued at S51,385.40, the American Express IDS account, subject to Johnny's credit as set 
forth above, and her Federal Retirement Systems pension. 
8. All remaining Series EI.: Savings Bonds shall be divided equally. The 
parties are ordered to cooperate with each other in identifying these bonds and dividing them 
equally, to include requesting an itemized 
from the Treasury Department. 
9. Johnny is ordered to 
incurred in this matter. 
DATED this (if day of 
list of bonds issued in the names of both parties 
pay Jeanny S2.500 for the attorney's fees she has 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
5 THE COURT: I appreciate the way this case has 
6 been handled, counsel, and I appreciate your 
7 professionalism on this. 
8 Substantively, what I'm going to do is dissolve 
9 or—dissolve the marriage or award the property by 
10 determining that alimony is appropriate, but somehow , 
11 calculate the future worth of the difference in 
12 incomes, based on a present award, and somehow factor 
13 that into the difference of the division of the marital 
14 assets. 
15 It seems to the Court that a 35-year marriage, and 
16 with the abilities shown here by the 'Respondent that he 
17 has many trades, he has had a successful career with 
18 Chevron and with Costal. He's also pretty adept at 
19 running a swather for--in the summer months. He's got 
20 many trades. The woodworking is probably something 
21 that appeals to him and probably something that he will 
22 continue to do. My estimate is that's what he likes to 
23 do and probably, at his age, that's what he'll continue 
24 to do. I think that, if he wanted to, he could make 
25 more income—that's subjective, though, and there's no 
12 6 
1 real evidence in the record to support that. 
2 A 35-year marriage, I think that the standard of 
3 living and the difference in income justifies an 
4 alimony award in this case. There's been a divergence 
5 of testimony in terms of the cash that was given over, 
6 but absent receipts or canceled checks, or so forth, I 
7 can only believe the side that's telling me it didn't 
8 happen. If, during the course of a divorce, an 
9 estranged husband is going to be paying cash to a 
10 spouse, his attorney should have advised him, or he'd. 
11 better have enough common sense to put it in the form 
12 of a check or a receipt. He says he paid her a bunch 
13 of cash, she says he may or may not have—or he didn't, 
14 flat out- I'm going to give the Petitioner the benefit 
15 of the evidence on that one. 
16 I think that attorney's fees award are 
17 appropriate. I think the fee is entirely reasonable, 
18 given the situation. I think that the Respondent has a 
19 lot more ability to earn income and to choose the way 
20 he'll earn the income than does the Petitioner. The 
21 Petitioner's stuck in her BLM job. I didn't hear any 
22 evidence about her educational background or other 
23 skills, but it's my belief, based on the evidence, that 
24 that's probably what she's going to do the rest of her 
25 life. 
127 
ill What I'm going to do, though, is--and I'll allow 
2 || counsel to invite me to rule on issues I haven't 
3 || covered--I've given you the substance of what I want to 
4 || do. I think she's entitled to at least $1,000 a month 
5 alimony. And based on that figure, I want counsel to 
6 go to your actuarial tables. I didn't hear in the 
7 record the ages of the parties, but I think that 
8 alimony should continue until one of the parties is 
9 able to retire at the age of 62 or 65—probably 65, in 
10 his case. Give me the present value of that kind of.. 
11 money, payable now. Work that into the difference on 
12 the marital asset equation of about — and I'll find the 
13 difference is $192, as compared to $165. That figure 
14 will have to come from the—if--I guess there's a tax 
15 I benefit to awarding it that way. There's some 
16 advantage to the Petitioner in getting a lump sum, 
17 that's what she's asked for. She'll have a credit of 
18 the first year or two, or two and a half years, at 
19 least, of the difference in marital assets. That other 
20 figure, I guess, needs to be paid. I'll give him a 
21 credit for the $6,100 cash that remains in the bank 
22 account. I'll give him a credit for half of the 
23 appraisal fee. And I guess, off the top of my head, 
24 without knowing the ages of the parties, I have no 
25 realm of what that number would be, and I'll either 
128 
1 1 convert that to a monthly payment or a lump sum payment 
2 I and give the Petitioner the option of exercising that, 
3 giving the Respondent enough time to be able to finance 
4 that, sell the farm, or get it paid. 
5 MS. BLAKELOCK: Your Honor, just for your record, 
6 both parties are 55, so you're talking 10 years. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, present value then of 
8 I $120,000 would probably be around $75,000, $80,000--I 
9 don't know, I'm guessing. 
10 MR. WOODALL: What kind of discount rate would the 
11 Court use? 
12 THE COURT: You've got to use the one in The Wall 
13 Street Journal that everybody uses. 
14 MR. WOODALL: Okay. 
15 MS. BLAKELOCK: And can I ask a question? When 
16 you're saying a credit of 6,100 to him and half the 
17 appraisal fee, so it's—and the difference between 192 
18 and 65, which is 27,000, what I'm understanding you to 
19 say is, the difference between 192,000, 165,000 is 
20 27,000, plus you add into that 6,100 for the credit of 
21 the money in the account, plus 300, and then that would 
22 1 be the first amount of alimony he has paid to her. And 
23 then following that--
24 THE COURT: I'm not following you. 
25 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. Well, I'm just trying to 
12 9 
1 restate what you said--
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 I MS. BLAKELOCK: --so I know if I understand it. 
4 THE COURT: Conceptually, I think, if you compare 
5 I 165 with 192, she's ahead "x" dollars. 
6 I MS. BLAKELOCK: Is 27,000. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 I MR. WOODALL: That didn't include the 10,000 or 
9 the retirement money. We still need to talk about 
10 that, b u t — 
11 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
12 MR. WOODALL: Yeah, right. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah. And my intent is to give her 
14 the retirement. 
15 | MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
16 I MR. WOODALL: Okay. 
17 I MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
18 THE COURT: And he doesn't get—he gets credit for 
19 the retirement that he's taken out and spent. 
20 MR. WOODALL: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: I didn't take that into account. 
22 She's put that money in her retirement. To divide that 
23 equitably, I'm going to give it to her. The federal 
24 government has a formula to divide that--neither one of 
25 them would be entitled to it. I don't know. I've 
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1 I worked through that before and it seems to me that, 
2 || equitably, perhaps he ought to get some credit for 
3 || that, but I'm just not going to give him any. He 
4 || doesn't get any credit for the profit sharing—I'm 
5 || going to give her that. 
6 1 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: She doesn't get it xtil she retires. 
8 There's no way she can cash it out. The federal 
9 government doesn't even like to divide it or deal with 
10 it now. 
11 MR. WOODALL: Excuse me. What does the Court mean 
12 by no credit? We don't even consider it in the totals? 
13 THE COURT: No. 
14 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: Correct me if I'm wrong, but I assume 
16 that that was not — is that part of the evaluation and 
17 the comparison you quoted, counsel, of 192, as opposed 
18 to 165? 
19 MR. WOODALL: No. 
20 MS. BLAKELOCK: You—that was not your— 
21 MR. WOODALL: No. 
22 MS. BLAKELOCK: —you did not include that, am I 
23 correct? 
2 4 MR. WOODALL: No, no. 
25 MS. BLAKELOCK: Yeah. No. He just add—I think 
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we both agreed that that was the difference in the real 
personal property— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: --which is 27,000. If I might 
rephrase my question—so, assuming that that's 27,000 
then that's credited, there's a difference of that, 
then you also want credited to him 6,100 that's left in 
the account, and half of the appraisal fee, which is 
300, correct? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: And then we—are we to take the 
27,000, plus the 6,100, plus the 300—that's a total of 
33,427 difference between them. Do I then divide that 
in half to get the amount that he's credited for his 
alimony, which is $16,713? Is that what you're saying? 
The total difference between them being 34,000, half of 
that would be 16,000, so he gets 16,000 credit for 
alimony payments—future alimony payments? I'm not 
trying to argue, I'm just trying to understand your 
ruling, so that opposing counsel and I are both on the 
same page here. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WOODALL: If we're — 
MS. BLAKELOCK: I just— 
MR. WOODALL: I don't understand why we're giving 
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her all of the 51,000, without any consideration, but 
charging him half of 6,000? 
MS. BLAKELOCK: No, I'm just — I'm not arguing, 
I'm just trying to understand what the Court's saying. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: I'm just trying to get — to repeat 
it back, because I'm going to write the document, 
that's all. 
THE COURT: I think he gets a full credit. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
THE COURT: He gets a full credit for— 
MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
THE COURT: —the 6,100 cash and one-half the 
appraisal fee. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay, so that's 33,400. So he 
gets—just to repeat to the Court—33,400 credit for 
alimony payments? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. All right. Jay, is that 
clear to you, so we can work on this? 
MR. WOODALL: Yeah, just add it up. 
MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. Yeah, make sure. 27,000, 
6,100 and 300. 
THE COURT: She gets the federal profit-sharing 
plan— 
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111 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: --totally. And I'm going to rely on 
3 counsel to give me a number coming from each camp. 
4 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
5 THE COURT: Or if you can agree on one, fine, and 
6 then that can be payable subject to agreement by the 
7 parties at the Petitioner's option. Let's say he's got 
8 a —let's —I'll give the Respondent a year to get his 
9 finances arranged to exercise the option to either pay 
10 it monthly or in a lump sum, at the discounted rate. 
11 That isn't what I said before— 
12 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
13 THE COURT: —because I think that—but I think 
14 I've changed my mind, and I ought t o — 
15 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: — I ought to leave that as an option. 
17 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. Then--
18 THE COURT: There'll be tax—there'll be a tax 
19 difference to both parties, but I think that probably 
20 I the Petitioner has asked for that because she doesn't 
21 want to deal with him. He may have some distress in 
22 getting the farm sold in that length of time, there may 
23 be some other problems, so I'm going to leave it in the 
24 form of an option that's available—I'll give him a 
25 year to exercise it. 
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1 I MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. To restate, for both 
2 || counsel, Respondent's given—there' s an award of 
3 || alimony in the amount of $1,000 a month for 10 years, 
4 || assuming that they're both 55 now and it's until the 
5 I age of 65. He's given a credit on the first $33,400 
6 for alimony. He's given a year to exercise, at 
7 Petitioner's option, within one year, whether it's 
8 payable at one lump sum, the discounted figure, which 
9 we're both going to agree on and provide to the Court, 
10 or if we disagree, we'll provide those figures to the-
11 Court, or—that's a lump sum payout, perhaps at the 
12 time of the sale of the property, or the payments will 
13 then continue on, if there's no buyout, at $1,000 a 
14 month for the next 10 years. Is that stated properly? 
15 THE COURT: Yeah, except retroactive to this—to 
16 probably today. 
17 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. Okay. 
18 THE COURT: Is there anything else that you want 
19 me to rule on? 
20 MS. BLAKELOCK: Just an understanding, Your Honor. 
21 You said—so I can put it in the figure--you said— 
22 THE COURT: Okay, the farm, the farm. I didn't 
23 talk about the farm. 
2 4 MS. BLAKELOCK: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: She doesn't get the lot. 
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1 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
2 THE COURT: That would be'impractical, I think— 
3 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. 
4 THE COURT: --and probably affect the 
5 marketability of the property and, if we believe what 
6 he said, he may have a problem with the salinity 
7 financing. 
8 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. And if I just might ask one 
9 more question? I apologize. You said attorney's fees 
10 were appropriate. Her testimony was 3,000—was that"-
11 the award? You never actually said the amount. 
12 THE COURT: I said your statement— 
13 MS. BLAKELOCK: But — 
14 THE COURT: --$2,500 was reasonable. 
15 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. Okay, those were my fees— 
16 she also had an additional 500. I was just trying to 
17 clarify that. So, it's 2,500? Okay. Thank you. I'll 
18 prepare the documents and send them over to opposing 
19 counsel, and my figures on the present-day value. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. I think, for the reasons I've 
21 stated, that that—I could support the ruling, and if 
22 there's any other questions you have, counsel, that 
23 would help you at this time, feel free to ask. 
24 MR. WOODALL: Can I have some sort of a finding on 
25 the Court's reasoning behind awarding her the full 
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l|| $51,000 thrift savings, without any consideration? 
2 1 THE COURT: Yes. My feeling is that he is trained 
3 in many trades, and he's going to work. He is going to 
4 be having to work, health permitting, and not relying 
5 on retirement. And maybe that's—now, based on my 
6 thinking, she is to a point in her life where, after 
7 35 years of marriage, she needs that retirement for her 
8 security. That's my reasoning, subjectively. 
9 Mathematically, for the Court of Appeals' benefit, I 
10 would think that, all factors considered, I'm still 
11 coming out with a fairly equal division, given the tax 
12 benefit that he's going to get from paying the alimony, 
13 either monthly or in a lump sum. 
14 MR. WOODALL: Okay. One further question—she did 
15 testify that, to the extent there are any double "E" 
16 savings bonds, she'll split them. Could that be part 
17 of the (inaudible)? 
18 THE COURT: Sure, yeah. 
19 MS. BLAKELOCK: If any are found by either party? 
20 MR. WOODALL: We'll just get a statement from the 
21 Treasury, whatever (inaudible). 
22 MS. BLAKELOCK: Okay. But if any are held or 
23 found, it could be either one of them lost some? 
24 THE COURT: What do you have to do to get lost 
25 ones replaced? 
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1 MR. WOODALL: Well, I've never done this, but I--
2 you can notify the Treasury Department and they'11 give 
3 you an accounting of what they've issued in your name 
4 and what's been surrendered (inaudible). 
5I MS. BLAKELOCK: And I just—we'll word it, if any 
6 treasury or "T" bonds are held by either party, they'll 
7 be split equally. 
8 THE COURT: She was buying some series "E" bonds, 
9 I think. 
10 MS. BLAKELOCK: Series "E"? 
11 THE COURT: Yeah. Whatever the bonds are, through 
12 her work. 
13 MS. BLAKELOCK: Any bonds held by either party, 
14 they'll—in either party's name, will be split equally? 
15 Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MS. BLAKELOCK: I'll prepare the documents, Your 
18 Honor. 
19 THE COURT: If I get this back from the Court of 
20 Appeals because I did not make findings sufficient to 
21 award her her entire profit-sharing amount, I'll have 
22 time to think about it. 
23 MS. BLAKELOCK: I'm sure we'll have additional 
24 hearings, if that occurs, Your Honor. Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
